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Abstract
Default reasoning and interpolation are two impor-
tant forms of commonsense rule-based reasoning.
The former allows us to draw conclusions from in-
completely specified states, by making assumptions
on normality, whereas the latter allows us to draw
conclusions from states that are not explicitly cov-
ered by any of the available rules. Although both
approaches have received considerable attention in
the literature, it is at present not well understood
how they can be combined to draw reasonable con-
clusions from incompletely specified states and in-
complete rule bases. In this paper, we introduce
an inference system for interpolating default rules,
based on a geometric semantics in which normal-
ity is related to spatial density and interpolation is
related to geometric betweenness. We view default
rules and information on the betweenness of natu-
ral categories as particular types of constraints on
qualitative representations of Ga¨rdenfors concep-
tual spaces. We propose an axiomatization, extend-
ing the well-known System P, and show its sound-
ness and completeness w.r.t. the proposed seman-
tics. Subsequently, we explore how our extension
of preferential reasoning can be further refined by
adapting two classical approaches for handling the
irrelevance problem in default reasoning: rational
closure and conditional entailment.
1 Introduction
We consider the problem of reasoning about what is true in a
particular situation (or for a particular object), given a generic
set of rules describing some domain of interest. One well-
known problem with using classical logic for this task is that
many rules have exceptions, e.g. birds generally fly but pen-
guins are birds which do not fly. If we only know that Tweety
is a bird, but not whether or not it is a penguin, it is reason-
able to assume that Tweety is a typical bird which therefore
can fly. We write α|∼β to denote the default rule ‘if α then
generally β’. A variety of approaches have been proposed to
reason about such default rules, most of which are based on
the idea of defining a preference order over possible worlds
and insisting that β is true in the most preferred (i.e. the
most normal) of the worlds in which α is true [Pearl, 1988;
Kraus et al., 1990; Pearl, 1990; Geffner and Pearl, 1992;
Benferhat et al., 1998]. A remarkable observation is that
despite the different intuitions underlying various systems,
there are particular defaults that are entailed by a given set
of defaults D = {α1|∼β1, ..., αn|∼βn} in the vast majority
of approaches. These defaults are captured by the axioms of
System P [Kraus et al., 1990]:
(RE) α|∼α
(LLE) If α ≡ α′ and α|∼β then α′|∼β
(RW) If β |= β′ and α|∼β then α|∼β′
(OR) If α|∼γ and β|∼γ then α ∨ β|∼γ
(CM) If α|∼β and α|∼γ then α ∧ β|∼γ
(CUT) If α ∧ β|∼γ and α|∼β then α|∼γ
where α ≡ α′ and β |= β′ refer to equivalence and entailment
from classical logic.
Example 1. Let D contain the following defaults, encoding
that adults normally pay taxes, but undergraduate and PhD
students are adults who do not normally pay taxes:
undergraduate|∼adult phd|∼adult
undergraduate|∼¬paysTaxes phd|∼¬paysTaxes
adult|∼paysTaxes
From (CM) we derive adult ∧ undergraduate|∼¬paysTaxes,
which means that when we only know that a given person is
an adult and undergraduate, we will assume that he or she
does not pay taxes.
This example also illustrates a second problem, which ex-
isting approaches to default reasoning do not alleviate: while
the set of defaults specifies that undergraduate and PhD stu-
dents do not pay taxes, there is no knowledge about master’s
students. Intuitively, since master’s students are conceptu-
ally somewhat between undergraduates and PhD students, we
would expect that they do not pay taxes either. This idea
that intermediate situations should have intermediate conse-
quences is called interpolation and has also received consid-
erable attention in the literature [Ko´czy and Hirota, 1993;
Dubois et al., 1997; Schockaert and Prade, 2011; Perfilieva
et al., 2012]. Interpolation is a convenient way of implement-
ing similarity-based reasoning: the commonsense reasoning
Figure 1: Conceptual space representations of categories and
examplars.
pattern whereby in absence of explicit information, humans
tend to make conclusions based on what is true for similar
situations [Collins and Michalski, 1989]. It is difficult, how-
ever, to quantify similarity degrees in a principled way, and
to determine how similar two situations should be before we
can assume with reasonable certainty that they have the same
properties. Interpolation, on the other hand, only relies on
a qualitative notion of betweenness, where information about
betweenness can be provided by experts or induced from data.
The idea of interpolating default rules, however, has to the
best of our knowledge not yet been considered. One problem
in combining both forms of commonsense reasoning is the
different nature of existing semantics: while default reason-
ing is based on ranking possible worlds, interpolation relies
on identifying conceptual relationships between natural lan-
guage labels. In this paper, we propose the notion of concep-
tual structures as a unifying semantics for default reasoning
and interpolation. Essentially, conceptual structures are qual-
itative abstractions of conceptual spaces [Ga¨rdenfors, 2000],
the latter being geometric models for the meaning of natu-
ral language labels based on prototype theory. Conceptual
structures are introduced in more detail in Section 2. Sec-
tion 3 then explains how we can see defaults and between-
ness information as constraints on conceptual structures, and
proposes an axiomatization for sound and complete reason-
ing about such constraints. This axiomatization generalizes
System P, and in particular, inherits its cautious nature. In
Section 4 we explore how our inference relation could be fur-
ther refined, by considering two extensions of System P: ra-
tional closure [Lehmann and Magidor, 1992] and conditional
entailment [Geffner and Pearl, 1992].
2 Conceptual structures
Closely related to prototype theory, Ga¨rdenfors’ theory of
conceptual spaces is a model for categorization [Ga¨rdenfors,
2000] in which natural categories are represented as convex
regions in some multi-dimensional feature space whose di-
mensions correspond to cognitively primitive features. Each
category is represented as the set of instances (i.e. points)
which are closer to the prototypes of that category than they
are to the prototypes of contrast categories. The notion of
betweenness, which underpins interpolation, can then be re-
lated to the geometric relationship of category representations
Figure 2: System P is not compatible with the idea of typical-
ity as geometric centrality.
in a conceptual space. This situation is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1, which shows the conceptual space representations of
a number of the categories a1, ..., a6 (defining a partition of
the conceptual space) and the categories b1, b2, b3 (defining
another partition). We could consider, for instance, that a4
is completely between a1 and a5 (because a4 is included in
the convex hull of a1 ∪ a5) and partially between a1 and a3
(because a4 overlaps with the convex hull of a1 ∪ a3).
Intuitively, a default α|∼β is valid if the most typical in-
stances of α are also instances of β. In prototype theory, ob-
jects are considered typical instances of a category when they
are close to its prototypes. This notion of typicality as geo-
metric centrality, however, is not compatible with the axioms
of System P. For instance, Figure 2 shows a situation in which
the most central elements of a are in b and in c, whereas the
most central elements of a ∧ b are outside c, thus violating
(CM). However, there is considerable evidence that the per-
ceived typicality of objects, by a given individual, does not
only depend on their closeness to prototypes but also on the
frequency with which they have encountered particular ex-
emplars [Nosofsky, 1988]. Figure 1 shows the exemplars that
have been encountered by a given individual; most exemplars
of a3 and a4 have been instances of b1 and most exemplars
of a6 have been instances of b2. We will consider that typical
instances of a category are those objects that are similar to a
large number of observed exemplars of that category. More
precisely, typicality will reflect the order of magnitude of the
density of exemplars. This view is compatible with the ax-
ioms of System P. In the scenario from Figure 1 it will lead
us to accept the defaults a3|∼b1, a4|∼b1 and a6|∼b2.
The semantic structures that we will use to formalise inter-
polative reasoning about defaults can be seen as qualitative
abstractions of a conceptual space and the associated density
of observed exemplars in different regions of that space. We
consider the propositional language built from the atoms in
A and the connectives ∧, ∨, ¬ and→ in the usual way. For
a propositional formula α we let JαK ⊆ 2A denote the set of
models of that formula.
Formally, we define a conceptual structure as a tuple
(Ω,B,B, pi), where Ω ⊆ 2A is a set of interpretations. In-
tuitively ω ∈ Ω if the region corresponding to the formula∧
ω|=a a is non-empty, i.e. the set Ω captures the part-whole
relations that are satisfied in a given conceptual space. For ex-
ample, identifying interpretations with the set of atoms they
make true, in the case of Figure 1 we would have
Ω={{a1, b1}, {a1, b2}, {a2, b2}, {a3, b1}, {a3, b3}, {a4, b1},
{a4, b2}, {a4, b3}, {a5, b3}, {a6, b2}, {a6, b3}}
The ternary relations B,B ⊆ 2Ω × Ω × 2Ω capture the be-
tweenness information from a conceptual space. In partic-
ular, (X,ω, Y ) ∈ B means that reg(ω) is entirely between
reg(X) and reg(Y ), where we write reg(ω) for the non-
empty and convex region corresponding to ω and reg(X) =⋃
ω′∈X reg(ω
′) for a set of interpretations X . Similarly,
(X,ω, Y ) ∈ B means that reg(ω) is partially between reg(X)
and reg(Y ). In the scenario of Figure 1, we would have,
among others:
({a1}, a4, {a5}) ∈ B ({a1, a3}, a4, {a2, a6}) ∈ B
({a1}, a4, {a2}) ∈ B ({a3, a5}, a4, {a6}) ∈ B
({a1}, a4, {a2}) /∈ B ({a3, a5}, a4, {a6}) /∈ B
We will furthermore require that conceptual structures satisfy
the following properties. First, if ω is entirely betweenX and
Y , then it should also be partially between X and Y :
B ⊆ B (1)
Betweenness is monotonic w.r.t. set inclusion:
if (X,ω, Y ) ∈ B and X ⊆ Z then (Z, ω, Y ) ∈ B (2)
if (X,ω, Y ) ∈ B and X ⊆ Z then (Z, ω, Y ) ∈ B (3)
Betweenness is symmetric:
(X,ω, Y ) ∈ B iff (Y, ω,X) ∈ B (4)
(X,ω, Y ) ∈ B iff (Y, ω,X) ∈ B (5)
A non-empty region cannot be between an empty region and
another region:
(∅, ω,X) 6∈ B (6)
Every region is between itself and any other non-empty re-
gion
if ω ∈ X and Y 6= ∅ then (X,ω, Y ) ∈ B (7)
The following postulate asserts that partial betweenness is
sufficient for a triple to be in B:
(X ∪ Y, ω, Z) ∈ B iff (X,ω,Z) ∈ B or (Y, ω, Z) ∈ B (8)
The last postulate expresses that atomic propositions corre-
spond to convex regions:
{ω | (JaK, ω, JaK) ∈ B} = JaK (9)
We will call a conceptual structure admissible iff it satisfies
(1)–(9). If we see conceptual structures as qualitative descrip-
tions of conceptual spaces, it seems natural to require them to
be admissible. However, note that (1)–(9) are not sufficient
to guarantee that a conceptual structure can be realized in a
Euclidean space. For example, it can be shown that in any
Euclidean space Rn, a ⊆ CH(b ∪ c) and d ⊆ CH(a ∪ b) en-
tails d ⊆ CH(b ∪ c) where a, b, c and d are compact subsets
of Rn and CH denotes the convex hull operator. However, as
not every conceptual space is Euclidean [Ga¨rdenfors, 2000]
it seems more appropriate to limit the postulates to a more
conservative set.
Finally, the last argument pi of a conceptual structure is a
possibility distribution over Ω, i.e. a mapping from Ω to [0, 1].
Intuitively, the values pi(ω) reflect how dense the occurrence
of exemplars in reg(ω) is. Without loss of generality we can
assume that pi(ω) ∈ {λ0, ..., λk} for some 0 < λ0 < λ1 <
... < λk = 1. The distribution induces a partition Ω0∪...∪Ωk
of the set Ω, where Ωi = {ω |pi(ω) = λi}. The elements of
Ωk correspond to those areas of a conceptual space where
most exemplars are found. Note in particular that we require
pi(ω) > 0 for every ω ∈ Ω (i.e. non-dogmatism). In the case
of Figure 1, for instance, we may have (k = 1)
Ω1 = {{a3, b1}, {a4, b1}, {a6, b2}}
with Ω0 containing the remaining elements from Ω. We can
interpret the values λi as reflecting the order of magnitude of
the probability of encountering an exemplar with the proper-
ties made true by ω. We refer to [Benferhat et al., 1999] for
an interpretation of possibility distributions in terms of big-
stepped probabilities, in a non-monotonic reasoning setting.
3 Preferential reasoning
3.1 Semantics
To formalize interpolative reasoning with default rules, we
will interpret default rules and betweenness information as
constraints on conceptual structures, and thus indirectly as
constraints on conceptual spaces. Given a conceptual struc-
ture C = (Ω,B,B, pi) and X ⊆ Ω, we write corepi(X) for
the most typical interpretations among X , i.e.
corepi(X) = {ω |ω ∈ X,pi(ω) = max
ω′∈X
pi(ω′)}
When clear from the context, we will omit the subscript pi.
We say that C satisfies the default rule α|∼β if
∅ ⊂ core(JαK) ⊆ β
Note that, as a matter of convention, C can only satisfy α|∼β
if Ω 6|= ¬α, i.e. if core(JαK) 6= ∅. In this way, our interpre-
tation of defaults coincides with the view from [Benferhat et
al., 1997] that α|∼β iff Π(α ∧ β) > Π(α ∧ ¬β).
We will use two types of betweenness rules. First, we will
write α  α1 onα2 to denote that all typical instances of α
are conceptually between typical instances of α1 and typical
instances of α2. We say that C satisfies α α1onα2 if
ω ∈ core(JαK)⇒ (core(Jα1K), ω, core(Jα2K)) ∈ B
We may consider for example that a typical master’s student
is conceptually between a typical undergraduate student and
a typical PhD student: master undergraduateonphd (but
not, perhaps, students on an MBA).
Second, we write β1 on β1 → β to express that only in-
stances of β can be (partially or completely) between β1 and
β2; C satisfies β1onβ1 → β if
ω /∈ JβK⇒ (Jβ1K, ω, Jβ2K) /∈ B
For instance italy on spain → mediterranean expresses the
belief that only Mediterranean countries can be conceptually
between Italy and Spain.
Finally, in addition to default rules and betweenness in-
formation, we will also consider strict rules. We interpret
α → β, for α and β propositional expressions, as the con-
straint that α ∧ ¬β corresponds to an empty region, i.e. C
satisfies α→ β if
Ω ⊆ J¬α ∨ βK
Let D be a set of default rules, S a set of strict rules, and B
a set of betweenness constraints of the form α  α1 on α2
or β1 onβ1 → β. We say that 〈D,S,B〉 preferentially entails
the default α|∼β, written 〈D,S,B〉 |=P (α|∼β), if α|∼β is
satisfied by any admissible conceptual structure that satisfies
the defaults in D, the strict rules in S and the betweenness
information in B.
Note that the proposed framework essentially corresponds
to a form of qualitative reasoning about conceptual spaces,
taking into account part-whole relations (using strict rules),
typicality and betweenness. As such, it is orthogonal to the
proposal from [Ga¨rdenfors and Williams, 2001] to use quali-
tative spatial reasoning to reason about categories in concep-
tual spaces with vague boundaries. Indeed, the notion of con-
ceptual structures could be generalized by associating with
each natural language category a nested set of regions. This
would, however, require us to formalize the interaction be-
tween typicality and categorical membership degrees, which
is perhaps not yet sufficiently well understood. Another re-
lated approach is [Alenda and Olivetti, 2012], which proposes
a preferential semantics for a logic in which relative distance
between concepts can be expressed. This approach is some-
what dual to what we propose: instead of proposing geomet-
ric semantic structures in which both defaults and spatial re-
lationships can be expressed, [Alenda and Olivetti, 2012] rep-
resents spatial relationships using preferential structures.
3.2 Axiomatization
To capture preferential entailment with betweenness infor-
mation, we need the axioms of System P as well as a new
axiom allowing us to conclude α|∼β from α1|∼β1, α2|∼β2,
α  α1 onα2 and β1 onβ2 → β. As the following example
illustrates, however, this is not sufficient for complete reason-
ing about conceptual structures.
Example 2. Let S = ∅, D = {x|∼β1, α2|∼β2, α3|∼β3} and
let B contain the following betweenness information:
δ  (x ∧ y)onα2 β1onβ2 → µ
δ  (x ∧ ¬y)onα3 β1onβ3 → µ
Every conceptual structure satisfying x|∼β1 will satisfy x ∧
y|∼β1 or x ∧ ¬y|∼β1. However, from x ∧ y|∼β1, α2|∼β2,
δ  (x ∧ y) on α2 and β1 on β2 → µ we can derive δ|∼µ
using the proposed interpolation principle. If x ∧ ¬y|∼β1
holds, together with α3|∼β3, δ  (x ∧ ¬y) onα3 and β1 on
β3 → µ, we can again derive δ|∼µ. It follows that δ|∼µ will
hold in every conceptual structure satisfying 〈D,S,B〉, yet
we cannot derive this using the aforementioned axioms.
To address this issue, we need to consider propositional
combinations of default rules in the language. Formally,
we consider the language L defined as follows: every de-
fault α|∼β (with α and β propositional formulas over the
set of atoms A) is in L; every betweenness rule of the form
α  α1 onα2 or β1 on β2 → β is in L; every propositional
formula is in L; if ψ and φ are in L then also ψ ∨ φ, ψ ∧ φ,
ψ → φ and ¬ψ are in the L. We can now formulate the ax-
ioms of System P (only considering defaults with a consistent
antecedent) and the interpolation principle (I) as implications
in L
(RE) α|∼α provided that S ∪ {α} is consistent
(LLE) (α ≡ α′) ∧ (α|∼β)→ (α′|∼β)
(RW) (β → β′) ∧ (α|∼β)→ (α|∼β′)
(OR) (α|∼γ) ∧ (β|∼γ)→ (α ∨ β|∼γ)
(CM) (α|∼β) ∧ (α|∼γ)→ (α ∧ β|∼γ)
(CUT) (α ∧ β|∼γ) ∧ (α|∼β)→ (α|∼γ)
(I) (α1|∼β1) ∧ (α2|∼β2) ∧ (α α1onα2)
∧ (β1onβ2 → β)→ (α|∼β)
We also need to add the following axioms:
(PROP) The axioms from propositional logic at the meta-
level
(RM) (α|∼γ) ∧ ¬(α|∼¬β)→ (α ∧ β|∼γ)
(INC) (α|∼β)→ ¬(α|∼¬β)
It can be verified that any conceptual structure satisfying
α|∼γ but not α|∼¬β indeed satisfies α ∧ β|∼γ. This cor-
responds to the property of rational monotonicity as an ax-
iom. However, this should not be confused with how rational
monotonicity is considered in relation to the rational closure
of System P [Lehmann and Magidor, 1992]. In particular, it is
well known that when α|∼γ is in the rational closure of a set
of defaults but α|∼¬β is not, then α∧β|∼γ will also be in the
rational closure. In the axiom (RM) considered above, how-
ever, ¬(α|∼¬β) does not refer to the fact that α|∼¬β cannot
be inferred, but to the fact that the negation of α|∼¬β can be
derived. Axiom (INC) is used to make inconsistencies among
defaults explicit at the meta-level.
Finally, we consider the following axioms about between-
ness:
(BetRE1) α αonβ provided that S ∪ {β} is consistent
(BetRE2) aona→ a for an atom a
(BetSYM1) (α α1onα2)→ (α α2onα1)
(BetSYM2) (β1onβ2 → β)→ (β2onβ1 → β)
(BetOR) (β1onβ2 → β) ∧ (γ1onβ2 → γ)
→ ((β1 ∨ γ1)onβ2 → β ∨ γ)
(BetLE1) (α ≡ α′) ∧ (α1 ≡ α′1) ∧ (α2 ≡ α′2)∧ (α α1onα2)→ (α′ → α′1onα′2)
(BetLE2) (β ≡ β′) ∧ (β1 ≡ β′1) ∧ (β2 ≡ β′2)∧ (β1onβ2 → β)→ (β′1onβ′2 → β′)
As will become clear below, these axioms form the counter-
part of conditions (1)–(9) and would need to be extended if
particular classes of conceptual spaces were considered (e.g.
Euclidean spaces). Note that (BetRE2) only holds for atoms,
and not for arbitrary propositional formulas.
We say that B is consistent with S if for every rule α  
α1 onα2 it holds that S ∪ {α}, S ∪ {α1} and S ∪ {α2} are
consistent, and for every rule β1 on β2 → β, S ∪ {β}, S ∪
{β1} and S ∪ {β2} are consistent. Similarly, we say that D
is consistent with S if S ∪ {α} is consistent for each default
α|∼β in D.
Proposition 1. Let S be a set of strict rules, D a set of de-
faults consistent with S, and B a set of betweenness rules
consistent with S. The following statements are equivalent:
1. 〈D,S,B〉 |=P µ|∼γ
2. µ|∼γ can be derived fromD∪S∪B using axioms (RE),
(LLE), (RW), (OR), (CM), (CUT), (I), (PROP), (RM),
(INC), (BetRE1), (BetRE2), (BetSYM1), (BetSYM2),
(BetOR), (BetLE1), (BetLE2) and modus ponens.
Proof. The soundness of the axioms w.r.t. the proposed se-
mantics is clear. Here we show that the axioms are also com-
plete. By (PROP), D ∪ S ∪ B is equivalent to a formula of
the form
(δ11 ∧ ... ∧ δ1n1) ∨ ... ∨ (δk1 ∧ ... ∧ δknk) (10)
where each δij is a propositional formula, a default rule or a
betweenness rule. Now consider one of the disjuncts
δi1 ∧ ... ∧ δini (11)
Let R be the set of defaults appearing as conjuncts in (11).
Without loss of generality, we can assume that, up to logical
equivalence, all default rules that can be derived from (11) are
contained inR. We can moreover assume thatR is consistent,
as otherwise we could use (INC) to derive ⊥ and eliminate
the disjunct (11) from (10). If this means that there are no
disjuncts left in (10), we can derive⊥ and using (PROP) also
µ|∼γ.
It follows from (RM) that we can assumeR to be rationally
closed without loss of generality, and in particular that there
exists a possibility distribution pi over the set of models of
S such that α|∼β ∈ R iff Π(α ∧ β) > Π(α ∧ ¬β). This
follows from the characterization of the rational closure from
[Benferhat et al., 1997].
Now assume that R contains no default rule of the form
µ|∼γ. We show that pi can be extended to a conceptual struc-
ture C = (Ω,B,B, pi) satisfying δ11 ∧ ... ∧ δ1n1 and thus〈D,S,B〉, but not µ|∼γ. It is clear by construction that C
does not satisfy µ|∼γ as otherwise this default rule would ap-
pear in R. We choose Ω as the set of models of S. Further-
more, (X,ω, Y ) ∈ B iff there is a rule α α1onα2 that can
be derived from B such that
core(Jα1K) ⊆ X and core(Jα2K) ⊆ Y and ω ∈ core(JαK)
Finally, (X,ω, Y ) ∈ B unless X = ∅, Y = ∅, or there is a
betweenness rule β1 on β2 → β that can be derived from B
such that
X ⊆ Jβ1K and Y ⊆ Jβ2K and ω /∈ JβK
We need to show that C satisfies the conditions (1)–(9). It is
straightforward to see why (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (9)
are satisfied.
Now consider (1). Assume that (X,ω, Y ) ∈ B \ B.
Note that this means that X 6= ∅ and Y 6= ∅ as the con-
sistency of B w.r.t. S ensures that no triples of the form
(∅, ω, Y ) or (X,ω, ∅) are in B. This means there exist for-
mulas α, α1, α2, β, β1, β2 such that α  α1 on α2 ∈ B,
β1 onβ2 → β ∈ B, core(Jα1K) ⊆ X ⊆ Jβ1K, core(Jα2K) ⊆
Y ⊆ Jβ2K, ω ∈ core(JαK)\JβK. From core(Jα1K) ⊆ Jβ1K and
core(Jα2K) ⊆ Jβ2K, given that pi is the exact semantic coun-
terpart of R (as R is equal to its rational closure), it holds
that α1|∼β1 and α2|∼β2 are contained in R. Together with
α α1 onα2 ∈ B and β1 onβ2 → β ∈ B , we find using (I)
that α|∼β can be derived from (11). In other words, we have
core(JαK) ⊆ JβK which is in confict with our assumption that
ω ∈ core(JαK) \ JβK.
Finally, we consider (8). It is clear by construction that
when (X,ω,Z) ∈ B or (Y, ω, Z) ∈ B then also (X ∪
Y, ω, Z) ∈ B. Conversely, assume that X , Y and Z are
maximal sets for which (X,ω,Z) /∈ B and (Y, ω, Z) /∈ B.
Note that this implies X 6= ∅, Y 6= ∅ and Z 6= ∅. From
(X,ω,Z) /∈ B there must be a betweenness rule β1onβ2 → β
that can be derived from B such that X ⊆ Jβ1K, Z ⊆ Jβ2K
but ω /∈ JβK. Due to the assumption on the maximality
of X and Z we can moreover assume that X = Jβ1K and
Z = Jβ2K. From (Y, ω, Z) /∈ B we similarly find that
there must be a betweenness rule γ1 on γ2 → γ that can
be derived from B such that Y = Jγ1K and Z = Jγ2K but
ω /∈ JγK. From Jβ2K = Z = Jγ2K and (BetLE2) we find
that β1 on β2 → β and γ1 on β2 → γ can be derived, and
because (BetOR) also (β1 ∨ γ1) onβ2 → (β ∨ γ). We have
that X ∪ Y ⊆ Jβ1 ∨ γ2K, Z ⊆ Jβ2K and ω /∈ Jβ ∨ γK, from
which we obtain (X ∪ Y, ω, Z) /∈ B.
4 Discussion
The inference system introduced in the previous section co-
incides with System P when no betweenness information is
present. As such it inherits the disadvantages of System P and
in particular its cautious nature. For example, from bird|∼fly
we cannot derive bird ∧ red|∼fly, despite that there is nothing
to suggest that being red would prevent a bird from flying.
To cope with this problem, a number of solutions have been
proposed.
One of the best known solutions is the rational closure
[Lehmann and Magidor, 1992], which is equivalent to Sys-
tem Z [Pearl, 1990]. Semantically, the rational closure can be
characterized as follows. Let Ω10 ∪ ...∪Ω1k be the partition of
Ω induced by a possibility distribution pi1 and let Ω20∪ ...∪Ω2k
be the partition induced by pi2. We say that pi1 is less specific
than pi2 iff for each i, Ω1i ∪ ... ∪ Ω1k ⊇ Ω2i ∪ ... ∪ Ω2k, i.e. if
pi1 considers more interpretations typical (or normal) than pi2.
Given a set of defaults D there is a unique least specific pos-
sibility distribution pi that satisfiesD [Benferhat et al., 1997].
The default rules in the rational closure of D are exactly the
default rules that are satisfied by pi. In the presence of be-
tweenness information, there may be several different possi-
bility distributions that are minimally specific, as illustrated
by the next two examples.
Example 3. Let S = ∅ and let D =
{α1|∼β1, α2|∼β2, α3|∼β3}; B contains the following
betweenness information:
(α3 ∧ u) (α1 ∧ x ∧ y)onα2 β1onβ2 → ¬β3
(α1 ∧ x) (α3 ∧ u ∧ v)onα2 β3onβ2 → ¬β1
The rules α1 ∧ x ∧ y|∼β1 and α3 ∧ u ∧ v|∼β3 are (classi-
cally) in the rational closure of D. If we accept these de-
fault rules to be valid, then interpolation would allow us to
derive α1 ∧ x|∼¬β1 and α3 ∧ u|∼¬β3, which suggests that
α1∧x∧y|∼β1 and α3∧u∧v|∼β3 should not be in the rational
closure. As a result, some sort of non-deterministic choice is
needed to obtain a ‘stable’ generalization of the rational clo-
sure. Accordingly, there are three compatible possibility dis-
tributions pi1, pi2 and pi3 which are minimally specific, where:
• pi1 satisfies α1 ∧ x ∧ y|∼β1 and α3 ∧ u|∼¬β3
• pi2 satisfies α3 ∧ u ∧ v|∼β3 and α1 ∧ x|∼¬β1
• pi3 satisfies ¬(α1 ∧ x ∧ y|∼β1) and ¬(α3 ∧ u ∧ v|∼β3)
A natural result would be to accept only the default rules that
are valid for each of these minimally specific models, e.g. we
would derive α ∧ u|∼β1 but not α ∧ x|∼β1 or α ∧ x|∼¬β1.
Example 4. Let D be as in the previous example, but let B
now contain the following rules:
x1  (α1 ∧ x ∧ y)onα2 β1onβ2 → y1
x2  (α3 ∧ u ∧ v)onα2 β3onβ2 → y2
where we assume that x1, x2, y1 and y2 do not occur in any
of the rules from D. Again there are three minimally specific
possibility distributions, and in only one of these the default
rules x1|∼y1 and x2|∼y2 are valid. However, in this example
there is nothing to suggest that being x ∧ y is exceptional for
α1 so α1∧x∧y|∼β1, and analogously α3∧x∧y|∼β3 should
be in the rational closure, which means that also x1|∼y1 and
x2|∼y2 should intuitively be in the rational closure. In con-
trast to the previous example, only considering those defaults
that are valid in each of the minimally specific possibility dis-
tributions appears to be too cautious.
Given these difficulties in generalizing rational closure, we
instead take inspiration from the notion of conditional entail-
ment [Geffner and Pearl, 1992] to introduce a technique for
refining the inference system from the previous section. Let
us define the set A of potential antecedents as follows:
A ={α | (α|∼β) ∈ D} ∪ {α | (α α1onα2) ∈ B}
∪ {α1 | (α α1onα2) ∈ B or (α α2onα1) ∈ B}
For each α in A we consider a fresh atom δα, intuitively cor-
responding to the assumption that we are in a normal situation
for α. Let us write ∆ = {δα |α ∈ A}. We now rewrite the
knowledge base 〈D,S,B〉 to a knowledge base 〈S∗, B∗〉 as
follows:
• add each strict rule from S to S∗; for each default α|∼β
in D, add α ∧ δα to S∗;
• for each betweenness rule of the form β1 onβ2 → β in
B, add β1 onβ2 → β and β2 onβ1 → β to B∗; for each
atom a ∈ A, add aona→ a to B∗.
• for each betweenness rule of the form α  α1 onα2 in
B, add (α ∧ δα)→ (α1 ∧ δα1)on(α2 ∧ δα1) to B∗.
A propositional interpretation ω is a model of 〈S∗, B∗〉 iff
• ω is a model of S∗
• For every (α ∧ δα) → (α1 ∧ δα1) on (α2 ∧ δα1) and
β1onβ2 → β in B∗ such that ω |= ¬(α1∧ δα1)∨β1 and
ω |= ¬(α2∧ δα2)∨β2, it holds that ω |= ¬(α∧ δα)∨β.
Similar to the construction in the proof of Proposition 1, when
Ω is a set of models of S∗ we can find relations B and B
such that the conceptual structure C = (Ω,B,B, pi) satisfies
S∗ ∪B∗ (for an arbitrary possibility distribution pi).
We say that 〈S∗, B∗〉 |= α for α a propositional formula
if every model of 〈S∗, B∗〉 is also a model of α. An irreflex-
ive and transitive relation < on ∆ is an admissible priority
relation if for every α ∈ A and every ∆0 ⊆ ∆ such that
〈S∗ ∪ ∆0 ∪ {α}, B∗〉 |= ¬δα there is a δ ∈ ∆0 such that
δ < δα. An admissible priority relation < induces a prior-
ity relation 4 on models of 〈S∗, B∗〉 |=, where ω 4 ω′ iff
for every δ ∈ ∆ such that ω 6|= δ and ω′ |= δ there exists a
δ′ ∈ ∆ such that δ < δ′, ω |= δ′ and ω′ 6|= δ′.
Finally, we say that α|∼β is conditionally entailed by
〈S∗, B∗〉 iff for every admissible priority relation < on ∆,
it holds that β is satisfied in every model of 〈S∗ ∪ {α}, B∗〉
which is minimal under the corresponding priority relation4.
Example 5. Consider the scenario from Example 3. The set
S∗ contains
α1 ∧ δα1 → β1 α2 ∧ δα2 → β2 α3 ∧ δα3 → β3
The set B∗ contains among others the rules β1 onβ2 → ¬β3
and β3onβ2 → ¬β1 from B, and
(α3∧u∧δ(α3∧u))→(α1∧x∧y ∧ δ(α1∧x∧y))on(α2∧δα2)
(α1∧x∧δ(α1∧x))→(α3∧u∧v ∧ δ(α1∧x∧y))on(α2∧δα2)
It can be verified that in any model of 〈S∗ ∪ {α1 ∧ x ∧
y ∧ δ(α1∧x∧y)}, B∗〉, one of the variables δα1 , δ(α1∧x), δα3 ,
δ(α3∧u) has to be false, hence in any admissible order one of
these should have lower priority than δ(α1∧x∧y). Similarly,
we find that one of these four variables should have a lower
priority than δ(α1∧x∧y), that one of δα1 , δα3 should have a
lower priority than δ(α1∧x), and that one of δα1 , δα3 should
have a lower priority than δ(α3∧u). We can then show that
(among others) α1|∼β1, α1 ∧ u|∼β1 and α1 ∧ u ∧ v|∼β1 can
be conditionally entailed, but not α1∧x|∼β1 or α1∧x|∼¬β1,
which is in accordance to the defaults that are valid for every
minimally specific possibility distribution in Example 3.
For the scenario from Example 4, it can be verified that
x1|∼y1 and x2|∼y2 can both be conditionally entailed, as we
would intuitively expect, which corresponds to the defaults
that are valid for one particular minimally specific possibility
distribution.
The previous example suggests that conditional entailment
does not suffer from the same problems as rational closure
in an interpolation setting, although further work is needed to
analyze its properties.
5 Conclusions
We have proposed an inference system in which interpolative
reasoning can be applied to default rules. At the semantic
level, both defaults and betweenness information are treated
as constraints on conceptual structures. At the syntactic level,
we have shown how the axioms of System P can be extended
with an axiom encoding the interpolation principle, although
we need a language in which propositional combinations of
default rules can be expressed to allow for complete reason-
ing. We have then shown how the resulting form of prefer-
ential reasoning can be refined by generalizing the notion of
conditional entailment.
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